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COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.
Jeremy Bentham was certainly a very remarkable man. With
all his radicalism, there was so much common sense in his conclusions.upon legal reform, that in spite of very strong prejudices
they have been gradually making their way both in England and
the United States, and in England faster than in the United States.
For more than twenty years the professional mind in England
may be considered as settled upon the opinion that all arbitrary
rules of exclusion of testimony are unjust and inexpedient; and
this opinion is not merely founded upon speculation, but created
and confirmed by actual experience in the administration of the
Law. Practically now in the English courts all p'ersons are competent witnesses, their credibility being left to the jury. In a
letter from Sir John Barnard Byles, author of the Treatise on Bills
of Exchange-and now one of the justices of the Court of Common
Pleas-to the writer of this article, March 3, 1860, he says: "You
do me the honor to desire my opinion on the practical effect of
the English statutes, tending to the abolition of the incompetency
of witnesses. As to the removing all disqualification from witVOL. 1O.-17
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nesses not parties to the cause, no difference of opinion exists. The
change has proved a salutary reform with no attendant evils. As
to admitting the parties themselves, and their wives, it has been
found (as might have been expected) that on the one hand, the
discovery of the truth is greatly facilitated, but that on the other
hand, perjury is greatly increased. Yet I think the general
opinion is, that the advantages of the change much -outweigh the
evils. Certainly my experience at the bar and on the bench has
led me to that conclusion decidedly, yet I would not extend the
capacitation to defendants in criminal cases, nor to inquiries into
adultery between, man and wife."
England, however, did not jump at once to the conclusion finally
reached, but proceeded slowly and cautiously step by step, trying
the effect of one change before proceeding to adopt another more
extreme and radical. First came the statutes 3 and 4 William IV.
c. 42; which enacted, that "in order to render the rejection of
witnesses on the ground of interest less frequent, if any witness
should be objected to as incompetent, on the ground that the verdict
or judgment in the action would be admissible in evidence for or
against him, he should nevertheless be examined; but in that case
the verdict or judgment should not be admissible for or against
him, or any one claiming under him." A much greater change was,
however, made by the statute 6 and 7 Vict., c. 85; which removed
incompetency by reason of incapacity from crime or on the ground
of interest in all persons except the parties to the suit, or the
persons whose rights were involved therein, such as the real plaintiff in the fictitious action of ejeetment, or any person in whose immediate and individual behalf any action was brought or defended,
or the husband or wife of such persons. These provisions having
been found to operate beneficially, the statute L4 and 15 Vict., c.
99, was passed, by the first section of which the proviso in the
statute 6 and 7 Vict., c. 85, (which excluded all persons directly
interested in the suit) was repealed. By the second section, the
parties and persons in whose behalf any action, suit, or other proceeding is brought or defended, are made (except as therein excepted)
competent and compellable to give evidence-on behalf of either or
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any of the parties to the suit in any court of justice. The third
section of the statute provides that it shall not render any person
charged with an offence, competent or compellable to give evidence
against himself, nor shall it in any criminal proceeding render any
husband competent or compellable to give evidence for or against
his wife, or any wife competent or compellable to give evidence
for or against her husband. The fourth section of the statute
further provides, that it shall not apply to any proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery, or to any action for breach of
promise of marriage. It was decided soon after it had become law,
that the second section of the statute did not render a wife admissible as a witness for or against the husband; and in consequence,
the statute 16 and 17 Viet., c. 83, was passed, enacting that
the husband and wife of the parties to any suit, or of the person
on whose behalf any such proceeding is brought or defended, shall
thereafter be competent and compellable to give evidence on
behalf of either party or any of the parties. Neither husband nor
wife is compellable, however, to disclose any communication made
or received during marriage; and neither party is a competent
witness in a criminal proceeding, or in any proceeding instituted
in consequence of adultery.
Such is a brief synopsis of British legislation upon the subject;
and now the important question is, whether some or all of these
changes ought not to be introduced into the jurisprudence of the
United States. In the State of New York they have been all
introduced-parties are competent for themselves, and compellable to testify for the adverse interest. So far the change seems
to have worked well in that State.
It would seem the dictate of prudence, that such alterations
should be proceeded in gradually and cautiously, as they have
been in England. The public should be accustomed to such important changes by degrees. The danger is, that the sudden throwing open the doors of evidence might at once admit too great a
crowd, and the profession and community might become disgusted
with some of the immediate consequences, and the system be repealed
as suddenly as it was enacted, without having had a fair trial.

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

There are dangers and inconveniences attending it, as well as advantages, and it is only by carefully weighing them all, which can
only be the work of time and experience, that a sound estimate of
the balance on one side or the other can be arrived at. What
should be done at first, and all that should be done, should be to
abolish the objection to incompetency, arising from interest or
infamy, and if after some years of trial, that change should be
found to be a real reform, it will be time enough then to open the
door still wider. It may be that a system which is found suitable
for England would be found not suitable for this country, and
then it would be comparatively easy to retrace our steps.. There
is the more force in this, as the disclosure of facts in the knowledge of parties may be obtained by means of a bill of discovery,
in aid of legal proceedings. Thus practically, a party is compellable though not competent to testify.
The civil law abounded in restrictions upon the admission of
witnesses, but it had one merit not possessed by the common lawthat of consistency. Its leading principle was exclusion, wherever
any possible motive existed, which could operate to produce falsehood. It extended its prohibition to relations (parents and children, by the Roman law-in the French law, collaterals, even to
the fourth degree;) to servants and domestics; freedmen and
clients; advocates, attorneys, tutors, curators, persons who had
been concerned in criminal prosecutions with either party, and
finally even those who by eating and drinking with the party by
whom they were produced, had thrown themselves open to the
suspicion of perjury. But the civil law is a system to which trial
by jury is a stranger, and great power and discretion are given
to the judge, both in admitting and excluding testimony, and in
deciding upon the weight which is due to it.
In England, those barbarous modes of judging of controversies
which belonged to the feudal system, the appeal to the special interposition of Providence, the ordeal, the corsned or morsel of execration, and the wager of battle continued long, but were finally
superseded by the trial by jury. The wager of law, which lasted
the longest, with its jury of compurgators, may have been the
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cradle in which this last mode of trial was originally nursed. "1He
that has waged or given security to make his law, brings with him
into court eleven of his neighbors-a custom which we find particularly described so early as in the league between Alfred and Guthrun, the Dane-for by the old Saxon constitution every man's
credit in courts of law depended upon the opinion which his neighbors had of his veracity. The defendant, then standing at the end
of the bar, is admonished by the judges of the nature and danger
of a false oath. And if he still persists, he is to repeat this or the
like oath: ' Hear this, ye justices, that I do not owe unto Richard
Jones the sum of ten pounds, nor any penny thereof, in manner
and form as-the-said Richard hath declared against me. So help
me God.' And, thereupon, his eleven neighbors or compurgators
shall avow, upon their oaths, that they believe in their conscience
that he saith truth; so that himself must be sworn de fidelitate,
and the eleven de credulitate. It is held, indeed, by later authorities, that fewer than eleven compurgators will do; but Sir Edward
Coke is positive that there must be this number, and his opinion
not only seems founded upon better authority, but also upon better
reason; for as wager of law is equivalent to a verdict in the defendant's favor, it ought to be established by the same or equal
testimony, namely, by the oath of twelve men. And so, indeed,
Glanvil expresses it, ,jurabitduodecimamanu: and in 9 Henry III.,
when a defendant in an action of debt waged his law, it was adjudged by the court quod defendat se duodecima rnanu. Thus, too,
in an author of the age of Edward the First, we read adjudicabitur
reus ad legem suam duodecrna manu. And the ancient treatise,
entitledDyversitM des Courts, expressly confirms Sir Edward Coke's
opinion." 3 Blackst. Com. 343.
In the first rude state of the trial by jury there are strong
grounds for believing that the twelve men drawn from the immediate vicinage of the parties, or rather of the fact to be determined,
decided in most instances from their own personal knowledge.
Hence arose, as we know, the necessity that a place as well as
time should be avowed in pleading every fact. We know, too, that
upon one issue, that arising upon the plea of non estfaetum, the wit-
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nesses named in the deed, as they usually then were, instead of its
being subscribed by them, were required to be summoned as jurors,
joined in the inquest, and united in the verdict. "But seeing the
witnesses named in a deed shall be joined to the inquest, and shall
in some sort join in the verdict, (in which case, if jury and witnesses
find the deed that is denied to be the deed of the party, the adverse
party is debarred of his attaint, because there is more. than twelve
that affirm the verdict,) it is reason that in that case of joining,
such exception shall be taken against the witness as against one
of the jury, because he is in the nature of a, juror :" 1 Inst. 66.
"Trial by jury,". says Sir Francis Palgrave, "according to the
old English law, was a proceeding essentially different from the
modern tribunal still bearing the ancient name, by which it has
been replaced, and whatever merits belonged to the original mode
of judicial investigation-and they were great and unquestionable,
though accompanied by many imperfections-such benefits are not
to be exactly identified with the advantages now resulting from the
great bulwark of English liberty. Jurymen of the present day
are triers of the issue: they are individuals, who found their
opinion upon the evidence, whether oral or written, adduced before them; and the verdict delivered by them is their declaration
of the judgment which they have formed. But the ancient jurymen were not empannelled to examine into the credibility of the
evidence; the question was not discussed and argued before them;
they, the jurymen, were the witnesses themselves; and the verdict
was substantially the examination of those witnesses, who, of their
own knowledge, and without the aid of other testimony, afforded
their evidence respecting the facts in question, to the best of their
belief. In its primitive form, a trial by jury was, therefore, only
a trial by witnesses, and jurymen were distinguished from any
other witnesses only by the custom, which imposed upon them
the obligation of an oath, and regulated their number, and which
prescribed their rank and defined its territorial qualification from
whence they obtained their degree and influence in society."
Palgr. 243. "If any of those knights, who appeared upon the
grand assize, happened to be unacquainted with the truth of the

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

matter they were rejected and others chosen, until twelve were
unanimous. If the jurors professed to know the truth, but dissented from one another in their statements of the fact, the array
was ' afforced,' that is to say, other witnesses were sought for,
cognisant of the disputed allegation, until twelve at least could
be found, who would give testimony, for that number was deemed
almost indispensable." Ib. 247. "Trial by jury was an appeal to
the knowledge of the country; and the sheriff, in naming his
panel, performed his duty by summoning those individuals from
amongst the inhabitants of the country who were best acquainted
with the points at issue. If, from peculiar circumstances, the witnesses of a fact were previously marked out and'known, then they
were particularly requested to testify. Thus, when a charter was
pleaded, the witnesses named in the attesting clause of the instrument, and who had been present in the folk mote, the shire or manor
Court, when the seal was affixed by the donor, were included in the
panel; and when a grant had been made by parol the witnesses were
sought out by the sheriff and returned upon the jury." lb. 248.
When the system, thus sketched, came subsequently in the progressive advancement of population and wealth to be of necessity
changed, reasons existed of sufficient force to lead to the adoption
of exclusionary rules.
It was, in effect, but applying, with some modification, the rules
in regard to the competency of jurors, who were, as we have seen,
both witnesses and triers, and, therefore, required to be omni
exceptione majores, to witnesses examined before them. It is certain, however, that from the earliest periods, of which authentic
records have reached us, the judges, in whose presence the trial
took place, have exercised the power of determining-what witnesses
shall be heard or excluded, and what evidence shall be submitted
to the jury. The jury was usually composed of rude and illiterate
men. It was supposed to be advisable to keep from them altogether, not only all which was not clearly relevant to the issue,
but every thing coming from sources open to suspicion. Thus
grew up a technical and artificial system: and as jurors became
more capable of exercising their functions intelligently, the courts
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have struggled constantly, so far as they could consistently with
the settled princijiles of such a system, to open the door as wide as
possible to the admission of all evidence, calculated to assist in
attaining equal justice in the controversy. Hence, so many rules
and so many exceptions to every rule: so many chapters where
the exceptions cover much broader ground than the rule itself.
Let us consider briefly the practical operation of the simple
change proposed of abolishing all objections to the competency of
witnesses on the score of infamy and interest.
I. Of infamy. It may be stated briefly, as the result of the
cases, that judgment against any person for treason, felony, or the
crimen falsi, renders him incompetent to testify. The crimen
falsi includes forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, and other
crimes affecting the administration of justice. It is not competent
for a party, when a person is offered as a witness, to give evidence
to prove him to have been guilty of such a crime. Even the verdict of a jury, if not followed by judgment, is inadmissible. Nor
will even, a judgment of the court of a foreign state render him
incompetent, though it is admissible, to affect his credit. If a
domestic judgment be reversed, though for mere irregularity, it
restores his competency, and a pardon completely rehabilitates him,
except when the statute, as a part of the punishment, expressly
imposes the incapacity.
Surely, the mere statement thus given condemns the rule of exclusion as arbitrary and unreasonable in the highest degree. The
worst criminals, if they have no motive to commit perjury, will
prefer to tell the truth, and the fact of legal infamy, though very
strong evidence, if such motive be shown to exist, that they are
wanting in moral principle to resist it, proves nothing, standing
alone, even as to the probability of perjury. The judgment should
in all cases be admissible to affect credibility-and the very distinction established between a foreign and domestic judgment is a
confession of the unreasonableness of the rule of exclusion. It is
a distinction without a difference, so far as any reason bearing
upon the probability of perjury is concerned. In like manner the
reversal of the judgment for error, not being the award of a new
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trial on the merits, surely ought not, upon any sound reason, to
restore the capacity of the witness. The moral taint is not wiped
out by such a reversal. Nor has a pardon any such effect. If,
therefore, a heinous crime should be committed, a gross fraud or
personal injury perpetrated, or important money transaction take
place, and no one present but a legally infamous person, however
much his testimony and all the circumstances corroborating its
truth, would leave no doubt upon the mind, yet, as he is incompetent to testify, the ends of public and private justice are all prostrated, because he might commit perjury. So may any witness,
convicted or unconvicted, and the business of the tribunals is to
sift evidence, to weigh its credibility, and to decide upon all the
light which can be thrown upon the subject. Had the incapacity
been confined to the single case of a conviction of perjury, something plausible might be urged in its favor. But why should treason exclude, and riot not; murder exclude, and assault and battery
not; robbery exclude, and embezzlement or cheating not. The
list of offences might be gone over, and when you came to settle
what crimes do and what do not indicate that want of moral principle which would probably produce perjury, no line of demarcation can possibly be drawn.
II. Interest. The rule is that a present interest in the event of
a suit excludes the witness. But it must be a certain interest, and
then no matter how small it is. If contingent, and no matter how
slightly contingent, then, without reference to its character or
amount, it is an objection to credibility only and not to competency. The only son and heir apparent of a party, who is claiming or defending a valuable estate, is heard without objection. A
gentleman of known probity, of high and honorable character, of
liberal education, of wealth and station, whose word in the society
in which he moves would be taken as readily as his bond, is excluded because he has some trifling pecuniary interest which be
is unwilling, and which it would be unreasonable to expect him to
release, while a poor wretched dependent of one of the parties, a
servant or retainer, who has no other resource but his bounty or
favor for his daily bread, is heard without scruple.
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A debtor in failing circumstances makes a bill of sale of his
goods to a friend. They are levied upon by one of his creditors
and the bona fides of the bill of sale is tried between the vendor
and the creditor. The legal interest of the debtor is, that the
creditor should recover; he is, accordingly, an incompetent witness
for him, but competent for the vendee in the bill of sale. Every
day's experience proves, that if the rule of exclusion is to
be based upon the probabilities of falsehood, the case should be
reversed.
It is too low an estimate of human nature to presume that the
force of pecuniary interest will generally or. even probably lead to
the commission of wilful perjury. The character of a man is of
more value in the society where he lives, than the amouut in controversy in any ordinary case. Men not only know this, but they
feel it. The hazard of detection is great, and would be increased
by the abolition of the exclusionary rule. -In fact, a new and
valuable security would thus be gained for the truth of evidence.
Pride of character is a more powerful principle of action than
love of money, and when it comes to the use of such means as
falsehood and perjury, it will instinctively shrink back and betray
itself in all but the most abandoned wretches, whose characters,
in general, may easily be proved aliunde. On the other hand, for
one case gained by perjury ninety-nine have been lost on account
of the parties being precluded, by artificial rules, from submitting
all the facts to the tribunal to which is committed the decision of
their cause.
No stronger exposition of the inconvenience of the rule of exclusion could be made than that which would be afforded by a digest
of all the cases, pro and con, which have been decided in this country and England, upon the subject of the incompetency of witnesses
arising from interest. How often are collateral issues thus introduced into a cause, and frequently, after years of litigation, the
deoision reversed in the appellate court, and sent back, because a
mistake was committed in the admission or rejection of a witness
on an objection of this sort-and how often are other witnesses
introduced to prove a witness incompetent, when, if the same rule
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was applied to them, which it is not, issue would branch out upon
issue, and the' decision become complicated beyond measure.
Mr. Bentham here, as in his other opinions, while he has
treated the general subject with great, though eccentric ability, in
his elaborate work in five volumes on Judicial Evidence, has gone
to extremes. He is for the admission of everything, however
remote, whether in the witness's own personal knowledge or the
mere hearsay of others, even cotemporaneous declarations, letters,
and papers of either party tending to throw light upon the subject in dispute. There certainly ought to be some barriers interposed against the manufacture of evidence; at least care should
be taken not to hold out encouragement to such practices. Such
would inevitably be the consequence of interfering with those most
salutary rules, which forbid the introduction of mere hearsay, what
may have been said by persons not produced in the face of the
court and subjected to cross-examination, and to declarations of
the party himself, which may be cunningly framed with an eye to
a future lawsuit. As to the question of admitting parties to the
suit as competent witnesses, it had better be deferred until the
experiment of admitting those affected with infamy or interest is
first tried. The rule adopted in New York, which allows a party
to call his adversary to the stand, and extract from him, if he can,
material facts, and yet leaves him at liberty still to contradict
him, seems to be rather a dangerous weapon in the hands of an
unscrupulous man. It would be preferable that the pleadings
between the parties, confirmed by their respective oaths or affirmations, ascertaining thus what matters of fact were admitted or
denied, should be submitted, or, at all events, that the old and
tried method by a bill of discovery should be retained as sufficient
G. S.
to answer every valuable purpose.

COURSER vs. POWERS.

ITn the Supreme Court of Vermont.CLARK COURSER VS.

eneral Term, Nov., 1861.

NOAH POWERS.

1

1. A justice of the peace, in an action against himself for an arrest under a warrant issued by him, cannot justify, if he had not, before such arrest, taken the
oath of office prescribed by the Constitution of the State.
2. Nor will a subsequent administration of the official oath, on the same day of the
arrest, enable him to do so, and the true time when such oath was taken may be
shown.
3. Neither will the taking of the official oath under an election to the same office
for the previous year enable him to justify; the official oath is only commensurate
with the appointment, and covers only the existing term of office.

This was an action for trespass for false imprisonment, and was
tried by the Orange County Court, at the June term, 1860. The
defendant pleaded not guilty, and gave notice of a special justification.
It appeared that on the 19th day of July, 1859, the grand jurors
1 We are indebted to the courtesy of Chief Justice Poland for the following very

able and satisfactory opinion and review of the cases, upon a question of considerable practical importance to public functionaries. The deference expressed
in regard to a doubt of our own, thrown out by way of argument, in the 29 Vermont Reports, is more than full compensation for our loss, in removing both the
doubt and difficulty, at the same time. We feel the less disposition to attempt any
counter argument, since the decision is evidently in the right direction, in attempting to make something of official oaths, which the practice of public functionaries
seems, sometimes, to be doing all it can, wholly to abrogate. My own former
doubts, whether the oath of office could any longer be regarded as matter of substance, was evidently based mainly upon the results of practical experience, in
seeing the utter uselessness of such a ceremony, which is wholly without any penal
sanction, and, in the majority of cases, apparently, quite as void of all religious
sanction, binding the conscience of the incumbent.

But we admire to find Courts

attempting to hold on firmly by the principles upon which the foundations of our
Government are laid; even while their house is tumbling about their ears, in consequence of the utter disregard of the spirit and force of those dead forms into
which it is certainly a commendable zeal to attempt to infuse some shadow of life
and energy. We say, with the full appreciation of the solemnity of our words,
God prosper the effort.
I. F. R.
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of Thetford made complaint to the defendant, as justice of the
peace, against the plaintiff, and the defendant, as such justice, thereupon issued his warrant against the defendant, who was arrested
thereon about eight o'clock in the morning, and -was detained by
the officer until near night, when be gave bail and was released.
It appeared that the defendant was duly appointed and commissioned as a justice of the peace for the year commencing December
1, 1858, but had not taken the oath of office when said warrant
was issued, but did take such oath about two o'clock in the afternoon of said 19th day of July, 1859.
It also appeared that the defendant held the office of justice of
the peace for the previous year, and that within that year he duly
took the oath of office.
The defendant objected to the evidence offered by plaintiff to
prove at what time the official oath was administered to the defendant on said 19th day of July, 1859, and the Court received
the same, subject to such objection.
It was thereupon agreed by the parties that the Court should
assess the plaintiff's damages, and that, if the Supreme Court
should decide that such evidence was admissible, and that upon the
.whole case the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the plaintiff should
recover final judgment for such damages in the Supreme Court.
The Court assessed the plaintiff's damages at five dollars.
The County Court gave judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff filed his exceptions thereto, and brought the case
into this Court.
The case was argued by
Howard and Collins, for plaintiff, and by
C. Tir Clarke, for the defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
POLAND, Ch. J.-The question presented by this case is, whether
a justice of the peace can justify an arrest upon a warrant, issued
and signed by him, before he has taken the official oath required by
the Constitution of the State. The defendant insists that it was
not necessary that he should take such official oath in order to
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justify under the warrant; that this requirement of the constitu
tion is merely directory.
If this cannot be maintained, then the defendant contends that
the oath taken by him, as a justice of the peace for the previous
year, when he held the office, extended over, and covered the succeeding year, when the warrant was issued; and also, that the
administration of the oath subsequent to the arrest of the plaintiff,
on his warrant, had relation back, and covered the whole of that
day, upon the doctrine that in law there are no fractions of a day.
Upon the two grounds last named the Court have experienced no
difficulty. Where a person is elected, or appointed to an office for
a fixed term, and takes the oath of office, the oath is commensurate
with the appointment, and covers that official term, and no more.
If the same person be re-appointed or re-elected, he holds his office
under the new appointment or election, and must be inducted into
office in the same manner as at the first. This was held to be the
law in relation to official bonds, in the case of Orange County
Bank vs. Mann et al., on the present circuit. The doubt in that
case arose from the general language made use of, which, without
any violence, might include the performance of the same duties
under another election. Nor do we regard this as a case in which
the rule, that in law there are no fractions of a day, properly
applies. This rule has in general been held applicable to transactions of a public character, such as legislative acts, or public laws,
or such judicial proceedings as are matters of record, when parol
testimony would be inadmissible to prove any thing in relation to
them, and if it were received, and an issue of fact allowed to be
made in every case when they came in question, would lead to
un'ertainty and confusion. Hence, as a rule of policy, as well as
of law, the day on which such act was done, as shown by the record,
is either wholly included or excluded from its operation. But this
doctrine is never applied in mere private transactions, involving
rights between individuals, either of property, or for an injury to
the person of one by the act of another; there the true time, when
an act was done, or a right or authority acquired by one, may
always be shown. We do not regard the taking of the official oath
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by the defendant as being an act of that public character, coming
within the rule, and if the arrest of the plaintiff, upon the defendant's warrant, was an illegal and unjustifiable act, as against the
defendant, if he had not taken the oath when the arrest was made,
we think it was admissible for the defendant to prove when such
oath was taken.
The whole subject, as to when this rule of law applies, is thoroughly examined and discussed by that eminent jurist, the late
Judge Prentiss, in a case before him in the District Court, reported
in the 20th Vermont Reports, 653, and we refer to that opinion
as embodying the true view of the law on the subject.
We are, therefore, brought to the direct question, whether tle
defendant can justify the arrest of the plaintiff, upon his warrant,
he not having taken the official oath. The Constitution of the State,
second part, section 29, provides that every officer, whether judicial, executive, or military, in authority under this State, before
he enters upon the execution of his office, shall take and subscribe
the oath of allegiance to the State, and the oath of office, and gives
the form in which each shall be administered. The defendant
having been duly elected and commissioned as a justice of the
peace, held the office under such an apparent title, that if he assumed to act as such, he was undoubtedly a justice de facto; so
that as to third persons his acts must be regarded as legal, and
could not be brought in question. But here the defendant, himself,
is called upon in an action to justify an arrest made by his command, and all the cases agree that in such case the officer must
show every thing done necessary not only to his legal election or
appointment, but also to his legal induction into office.
The reason for this distinction is obvious, and founded in good
sense and substantial justice. Third persons, who are called upon
to act under the authority of public officers, or who have occasion
to avail themselves of the official aid of such officers, are not supposed to know, or to have the means of readily ascertaining,
whether such officers have complied with all the necessary legal
requirements to qualify them to perform their duties, but if such
officer has been legally elected or appointed, and is in the per-
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formance of the duties of his office, they have a right to presume
that he has taken all the necessary steps to his due qualification.
But the officer himself has no such immunity, because there is
no occasion for it, as he must always know whether he has complied with the requirements of the law in his induction or qualification to the office.
This question has been before this Court to some extent in
former cases, though not expressly and directly adjudicated. In
Adams vs. Jad7cson, 2 Aik. 145, the plaintiff claimed title to the
land in question, under a deed from a constable who had sold the
land for taxes.
The record was produced of the election of the constable, upon
which was the word sworn. It was considered doubtful whether
this was sufficient evidence that the constable was legally sworn,
but the Court held that the constable being in office under a
valid election, he was de facto an officer, and the legality of his
acts could not be called in question between third persons. The
distinction between officers de facto, whose official acts bind third
persons, and officers de jure, who may themselves justify their
official acts, is very clearly defined by Skinner, Ch. J., and the
whole argument of the opinion proceeds upon the ground that in
order to make an officer de jure he must have taken the official
oath. Andrews vs. Chase, 5 Vt. 409, was an action of trespass
against a highway surveyor for property taken and sold for the
payment of taxes against the plaintiff.
The defendant was sworn before a justice of the peace on a day
subsequent to the meeting at which he was elected. The plaintiff
claimed that it should appear by the record that he was sworn,
and that the oath should have been administered by the town
clerk, or one of the selectmen. The Court held that the plaintiff
was properly sworn, and that it need not appear of record. In
this case also, it is rather assumed than decided, that unless the
defendant had been properly sworn, he could not justify his act
of taking the plaintiff's property.
In Putnamvs. Dutton, 8 Vt. 896, it was objected to an auditor's
report that it did not appear therefrom that the auditor was sworn,
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but proof was made in Court that he was in fact sworn. The Court
decided that it need not appear from the report that the auditor
was sworn, and that unless the contrary was proved, it would be
presumed he was, as the statute then required it. In the opinion
of -the Court, Redfield, J., says: "It is true the statute requires
the auditor to be sworn, and if he proceeds without being sworn,
and this is made to appear in the proper mode, the report could
not be accepted."
In McGregor vs. Balch et al., 14 Vt. 428, the question was
whether the official acts of a justice of the peace, who also held
the office of deputy postmaster, were valid between third persons.
Williams, Oh. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, discusses at length the distinction between an officer de facto, whose
acts are valid, as respects third persons, but invalid, as respects
himself, and-an officer de jure, who can himself justify, and cites
with approbation the case in 5th Mass., where it was held that an
officer not duly sworn could not justify his acts in an action against
himself. The same question has been before the Courts in other
States, and by implication, at least, decided.
Colburn vs. Ellis et al., 5 Mass. 427, was an action for an assault and false imprisonment; the defendants justified, as parish
assessors, and the point directly decided by the Court was, that
the record of the official oath of the defendants, did not show that
they were properly sworn into office, and judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff. No question was made, as appears by the case,
either by Court or counsel, but that this was necessary to enable
defendants to justify the arrest of the plaintiff.
In Wells et al. vs. Battelle et al., 11 Mass. 477, the direct point
decided was, as to the power of a parish clerk to amend his record,
so as to show that the defendants were duly sworn as assessors.
In Bucknan vs. Buggles, 15 Mass. 180, it was held that a levy of
an execution upon real estate, made by a deputy sheriff, who had
not been duly sworn as such, was valid betweeu the debtor and
creditor, upon the ground that he was a good officer de facto.
Both these cases, by implication, clearly recognise the doctrine,
that to make a public officer, such de jure, so that he can protect
18
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himself under his official shield, he must take the official oath,
when one is required by law.
In People vs. Collins, 7 Johns. 549, it was held that the acts of
commissioners of highways, who had not been sworn into office,
were valid as to third persons, on the ground they were officers
de facto.
In New Hampshire the question seems to have been more
directly decided. The Constitution of that State, is very similar
to our own in this respect, except, that it does not apply to town
officers. But by statute in that State, all town officers, before they
enter upon the performance of official duties, are required to take
the official oath.
In Johnston vs. Wilson et al., 2 N. H. 202, it was decided that
in an action against a town collector for property seized for taxes,
the defendant could not justify the taking unless he had been duly
sworn into office. The arguments of the counsel are not given, so
that it cannot be known what ground was claimed, but the point
is discussed with the usual fulness of learning that characterized
Judge Woodbury, and is directly decided.
In Proprietorsof Cardiganvs. Page, 6 N. H. 182, it was decided
that a sale of lands by a town collector for taxes was void, unless
it appeared by the record that such collector had taken the oath
prescribed by law. It will be noticed that under a similar state
of facts, this Court held, in Adams vs. Jackson, ubi sup., that the
acts of the collector were valid as an officer de facto.
In a subsequent case, Blake vs. Sturtevant et al., 12 N. H. 567,
Upham, J., speaking of this case, says: "This case is now qualified in those instances where third persons are interested, where it
is merely necessary to show an officer de facto, but the rule is correctly laid down in all cases where an individual must be shown to
be an officer de jure." The last named case was an action against
the selectmen of Keene for causing the plaintiff's oxen to be sold
for taxes, and it was held that the defendants could not justify
their official acts, without proving that they were duly qualified
by taking the oath prescribed by law, that without this they were
not officers de jure.
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In cavisvs. Bobinson, 9 N. H. 524, it was decided that a collector
of taxes duly elected by the town, could not justify a taking of
property for taxes, unless he had duly taken the oath of office.
The same principle was again affirmed in Ainsworth vs. Dean, 1
Fost. 400, and in several other cases in New Hampshire. In
Maryland their State Constitution has a provision in nearly the
same language as our own, requiring all officers to take and subscribe the oath of office before they enter upon its duties.
In Thomas vs. Owens, 4 Maryland, 189, the question arose in
the following form: The plaintiff was elected controller of the treasury on the 5th of November, 1851, and duly commissioned, but
did not take the official oath until the 24th of February, 1852.
The plaintiff claimed that his salary commenced at the time of his
election and date of his commission. The defendant, who was
treasurer of the State, refused to pay, except from the time the
plaintiff took the oath of office, and the question before the Court
was, which was right. The Court decided in favor of the defendant. Le Grand, Ch. J., said, "Now we hold that the late controller
could not be considered as an officer until he was qualified by taking
the oath prescribed by the fourth section of the first article. After
his election and commission by the Governor, he had the right to
invest himself with the powers and entitle himself to the salary,
by qualifying in the manner pointed out by the constitution, but
until he actually did qualify, he was no more controller than any
other citizen, his qualification being an indispensable prerequisite
to his investiture with the authority and responsibilities of the
office." We have found no decision in conflict with the cases
above referred to.
In considering the effect of this provision of the constitution, it
is proper to refer to the common law on the subject, and the importance which had ever been attached to oaths in England, from
whence our own law is mainly derived. By the common law all
officers of justice were bound to take an oath for the due execution of justice; though it was held that if such promissory oath
were broken, the violators could not be punished for perjury, but
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should be punished by a severe fine: Jac. Law Dictionary, title
Oath, Wood's Inst. 412.
The acts of Parliament requiring oaths of every person appointed to perform any office, trust, or duty, are very numerous,
and not only for such purposes, but oaths applying to particular
classes, and sometimes to the whole people, as the test oaths, oath
of supremacy, &c., important events, not only in the legal, but
also in the political history of that Government. It was ever
regarded as an important guaranty for the due performance of
any public office or duty, that the person to perform it should, in
a public and solemn manner, call God to witness his promise to be
just and faithful in the administration of it.
Such being the estimation of the importance and value of oaths,
when our Constitution was formed, we cannot suppose that our
ancestors, in making this requirement and express provision of the
fundamental law of the State, intended it to be merely directory,
and to be obeyed or not, at the pleasure of her public servants.
Their idea was similar, as we think, to that expressed by a very
ancient English writer, who says, "Anciently, at the end of a
legal oath was added, so help me God at his holy dome, i. e., judgment, and our ancestors would not believe that a man could be
so wicked as to call God to witness any thing which was not true,
but that if any one should be perjured, he must continually
expect that God would be the revenger." We are of opinion,
therefore, that the official oath required by the constitution is a
necessary requisite to the legal induction into office, and that any
person who has been legally elected or appointed to such office,
and assumes its duties without taking the oath, cannot be regarded
as an officer de jure, and cannot, therefore, in an action against
himself justify under his official character. This view, we believe,
is not only in accordance with principle and authority, but also in
harmony with the general understanding and practice of the people, of the legal profession, and judicial tribunals of the State ever
since the constitution was formed. We have examined this subject
with the more care, in consequence of an opinion advanced by a
late distinguished judge of this Court, in giving the judgment of

